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The Right Balance: Qualified 
Immunity and Section 1983 
Jana Minich 
History and Government — Cedarville University 
Introduction 
fficer Garrison and his K-9 (police dog), accompanied by another officer, were in 
pursuit of a robbery and assault suspect.1 Garrison knew that the suspect was African 
American, bald, and approximately five-foot, ten inches tall. It was late at night, and 
the K-9 was tracking the scent of the suspect to an apparently abandoned home near a 
known homeless camp. Christopher Maney, who had been in the homeless camp, mistook 
the police for violent enemies of some of the camp’s inhabitants and fled in fear. As he hid 
behind bushes in the dim light of the streetlamps, he never heard the officers’ warnings 
that they were using a K-9. As Garrison and his dog closed in on Maney, the K-9 gave signs 
that he was near the suspect. Garrison shortened the leash on the K-9 and headed for the 
abandoned house. Suddenly, the dog leapt into the bushes concealing Maney and began 
biting him on the head. Garrison almost immediately ascertained that the Caucasian, non-
bald man under attack was not the African American, bald suspect. However, for seven to 
ten seconds, the K-9 continued to bite Maney while Garrison refused to call off the dog. 
Garrison repeatedly commanded the besieged Maney to show his hands, which he was 
using at the time to struggle against the attacking dog. When it was all over, Maney was 
severely injured and bleeding profusely. Maney subsequently sued Garrison for allowing 
the dog to continue to bite him even though it was clear that he was not the suspect the 
officer sought. 
 
What happens in Mr. Maney’s lawsuit may seem straightforward at first. After all, it is 
essentially a common tort—a lawsuit for wrongdoing or negligence. However, this case is 
different because it does not encompass only the concerns and interests of the parties 
involved. This is a lawsuit against a police officer, and that means it has the inherent ability 
to affect other officers who find themselves in positions similar to Garrison’s. Thus, there 
are really three perspectives in play.  
 
From Maney’s point of view, this was a violent aggression that, while admittedly an 
accident, was prolonged even when the officer knew that he was innocent. The appellate 
court acknowledged that Maney was “guilty at worst of being in the wrong place at the 
                                               
1 Maney v. Garrison, No. 14-7791 (4th Cir. March 9, 2017) (unpublished). All facts of the case found on pages    
3-8 of the opinion. 
O 
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wrong time and failing to reveal himself to the police.”2 And it’s plausible that the reason 
Maney did not reveal himself is that he was worried he would have startled the officer and 
dog if he did.3 Even if that were not a realistic fear, it is fair to say that anyone in his 
situation would be frozen in fear. Maney’s innocence and misfortune are uncontested. 
 
From Officer Garrison’s point of view, Maney’s actions sparked a “tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving” situation. More specifically, Officer Garrison faced the horrified shock of 
finding out that a man was hiding in bushes just feet from him for no clear reason.4 
Garrison also instinctively knew that his K-9 was trained to only attack in very specific 
circumstances: when the K-9 was commanded to, when the K-9 encountered the tracked 
suspect, or when Garrison or the K-9 were attacked.5 Thus, he would have good reason to 
believe that “the two were hiding together or had recently been in close contact.”6 In far 
less time than it takes to explain these reasons, Officer Garrison had collected and 
processed all the information necessary to decide that it was safe to call off his K-9. In those 
few seconds, he was rightfully looking out for the safety of his colleague and himself. As the 
court acknowledged, “threats to officer safety are not imaginary, and [] police are often 
asked to intervene at a moment’s notice in tense, difficult situations, on the basis of 
imperfect information and with little time for deliberation.”7 Is it really reasonable to 
expect officers to act instantly and correctly in the face of life-threatening situations?  
 
A third consideration goes beyond Garrison, Maney, and their unfortunate encounter. How 
will the outcome of the case affect officers in the future? If Garrison were excoriated for his 
mistake, would other officers fear that they risked legal action for defending themselves 
and their fellow officers? On the other hand, would letting Garrison off the hook with no 
consequences contribute to a sense of exemption from law and encourage a lack of care in 
policing? These perplexing questions are at the heart of legal analysis in many lawsuits 
against police officers and have played a shaping role in the jurisprudence of lawsuits 
against officers. 
 
This paper addresses lawsuits against officers, specifically focusing on a longstanding legal 
doctrine known as qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects public officials from 
civil liability, given that a certain set of conditions are met.8 Looking at the interplay 
between lawsuits against officers and qualified immunity reveals a difficult balancing of 
important values, which is constantly complicated by changing circumstances and 
unintended consequences. Beginning with the statutory and historical basis for such 
litigation and discussing the cases that significantly impacted this jurisprudence, we will 
examine these values and their related jurisprudential doctrines. Along the way, we will 
discuss the many issues that arose in constructing this jurisprudence, as well as how the 
Supreme Court has attempted to mitigate these problems. In the end, we will discuss 
                                               
2 Ibid., 8. 
3 Ibid., 6. 
4 Ibid., 21. 
5 Ibid., 4. 
6 Ibid., 18. 
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 Based on Black’s Law Dictionary 818 (9th ed. 2009). 
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suggested changes to the system and how they would affect this area of law, for better or 
for worse. The challenges of this jurisprudence have varied throughout its many landmark 
changes, and today it faces a need for increased guidance for lower courts, a renewed focus 
on constitutional rights articulation, and a notice-based standard for particularity. 
Legal Background 
The legal ability to sue police officers in federal court comes from the 1871 Federal Civil 
Rights Act, known also as the Ku Klux Klan Act. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as it is now 
codified) provides for a private cause of action for those who had been constitutionally 
wronged by those with actual or perceived legal authority.9 This was intended to supersede 
faulty and deficient state laws and provide remedies for constitutional violations, especially 
in areas where the Ku Klux Klan violated basic rights with no repercussions.10 Before the 
1960s, however, this law did not provide a remedy for those who suffered violations of 
their constitutional rights due to officers’ illegal conduct. Circuit courts interpreted § 1983 
as applying only to state-sanctioned discrimination rather than applying to abuses of 
power in general, which greatly limited its application as a remedy for constitutional 
violations.11 To this effect, the Seventh Circuit held, “The 14th Amendment does not 
empower Congress to... legislate against the wrongs and personal actions of individuals 
within the State... the Federal Civil Rights Act was never designed nor intended to redress 
the breach by a trustee of his equitable duties to the trust beneficiaries.”12 Later, the same 
court stated, “The Civil Rights Acts do not create a cause of action for false imprisonment 
unless such imprisonment is in pursuance of a systematic policy of discrimination against a 
class or group of persons.”13 Other cases ruled similarly and went unaddressed by the 
Supreme Court.14 
                                               
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...” It is also known under the 
citations “R.S. 1979” and “§ 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871.” 
10 Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167, 173-74 (1961). 
11 Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959), citing Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F. 2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), and Miles v. 
Armstrong, 207 F. 2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953). Referenced by Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1968). 
12 Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 339 U.S. 990 (1950), 70 S.Ct. 1015, 94 L.Ed. (Cites 
In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835.) 
13 Truitt v. State of Illinois, 278 F.2d 819, 820 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 866, 81 S.Ct. 109, 5 L. Ed. 
2d 88 (1960). 
14 Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F. 2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1956), ), certiorari denied 353 U.S. 964, 77 S.Ct. 1049, 1 
L.Ed.2d 914: “In either case, it is clear that the alleged tortious conduct of defendants was and is contrary to 
the laws of Illinois. In our view, such charges of aggression by state prison officials and guards, in spite of the 
general assertion that they were acting under color of state law, do not state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted under the federal Civil Rights Act.” Citing Ortega v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 216 F.2d 561, cert. denied 349 U.S. 
940, 75 S.Ct. 786, 99 L.Ed. 1268; and Jennings v. Nester, 7 Cir., 217 F.2d 153, certiorari denied 349 U.S. 958, 75 
S.Ct. 888, 99 L.Ed. 1281. 
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Monroe Era 
However, in the 1961 case Monroe v. Pape, the Court reversed directions and concluded 
that a proper interpretation of acting “under color of” law included abuse of power.15 They 
derived this interpretation in part from the comments in Ex parte Virginia concerning the 
Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 354) and in part from the United States v. Classic 
interpretation of “under color of any law” in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (then 18 U.S.C. § 52), which was 
later upheld in Screws v. United States.16 Together, these rulings led the Court to hold that § 
1983 applied to any misuse of state power, regardless of whether or not it is state-
sanctioned. The Court also noted that, unlike the criminal code in Screws, § 1983 should be 
“read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural 
consequences of his actions.”17 This made § 1983 a much more powerful tool for enforcing 
constitutional rights and keeping government officials accountable. However, such an 
interpretation of the statute would lead to many difficult questions concerning how to 
apply § 1983, which the Court turned to next. 
 
Following Monroe, the Court refined common-law immunities in § 1983 litigation. In the 
1967 case Pierson v. Ray, the Court established, based on congressional intent, analogous 
precedent, and tort law principles, that common-law defenses available to officers before 
the institution of § 1983 (such as good faith and probable cause) remained as a “limited 
privilege” for officers in § 1983 lawsuits.18 These immunities are important for protecting 
officers from legal “intimidation” while they exercise the discretion necessary to complete 
their work.19 The Court wrote, “A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose 
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable 
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”20 The Court reiterated this view of “good 
faith, reasonable grounds”21 immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), where it stated, “It is 
the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the 
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of 
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.”22 Scheuer also noted 
the “injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith” of holding an official liable for a 
discretionary decision that his position required him to make, as well as the troubling 
                                               
15 Monroe v. Pape. 
16 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880) (“Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State 
government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away 
the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the 
State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.”); United States v. Classic, 313 US 299, 
326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state law.”); Screws v. 
United States, 325 US 91, 112-113 (1945). 
17 Monroe at 187. 
18 Pierson v. Ray, 386 US 547, 554-55 (1967); citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951) (immunity for 
legislators) and Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 179 F. 2d 327 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950) (good faith and 
probable cause immunity for arresting innocents). 
19 Pierson v. Ray at 386. 
20 Ibid., 554-555. 
21 Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 485 (1978) (Description of Scheuer and Wood). 
22 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232, 247-48 (1974). 
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prospect of causing officials to shy away from their duties because of the threat of 
liability.23 
 
Qualified immunity became the leading question of § 1983 litigation against police officers. 
However, these two work against one another, as § 1983 remediates constitutionally 
wronged citizens, and qualified immunity protects officers from these lawsuits. 
Accordingly, Court’s opinion in Scheuer emphasized the importance of balance—
maintaining both the remedial intent of § 1983 and “the need to protect officials who are 
required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the 
vigorous exercise of official authority.”24 The case Butz v. Economou later addressed this 
balance, noting that, despite the need to protect officials, “it is not unfair to hold liable the 
official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an 
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the 
exercise of official judgment.”25 
 
With qualified immunity so well-grounded in case law, along with policy and practical 
justifications for it, Wood v. Strickland established a test for applying qualified immunity, 
articulating two prongs: objective analysis of law and subjective analysis of good faith.26 
Under the objective test, the court looked at whether the officer “knew or reasonably 
should have known” that his actions would violate a constitutional right.27 In other words, 
it looked at the status of the law. Under the subjective test, the court looked at whether or 
not the officer acted with “malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional 
rights or other injury.”28 In other words, it looked at the officer’s motivations. Under this 
test, qualified immunity is denied if the official displayed “such disregard of... clearly 
established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as 
being in good faith.”29 In 1978, Procunier v. Navarette reinforced these terms and concepts, 
reiterating that a “clearly established” right is one which we would expect the official in 
question to know.30 This test carried the clear benefit of looking at the holistic picture of 
the officer’s action and targeting the types of malice that created the need for § 1983 
remedies in the first place. However, later courts found that the subjective prong of the test 
could call for virtually infinite amounts of evidence as the courts searched for indications of 
motives and desires.31 Such an extensive evidence-collecting process conflicted directly 
with the purpose of qualified immunity recognized in Butz v. Economou and Scheuer, that of 
finding quick resolution to frivolous cases and affecting minimal intrusion into an officer’s 
                                               
23 Ibid., 240. 
24 Ibid., 504-506. Also addressed in Davis v. Scherer, 468 US 183, 195 (1984): “the balance that our cases 
strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective 
performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of 
harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for 
damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated.” 
25 Butz v. Economou at 506-507. 
26 Wood v. Strickland, 420 US 308, 321 (1975). 
27 Ibid., 322. 
28 Ibid., 322. 
29 Ibid., 322. 
30 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 US 555, 562 (1978). 
31 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 814-817 (1982). 
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life and work.32 As the Court later stated, “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or 
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands 
customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.”33 
Harlow Era 
Recognizing this issue, the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald eliminated the subjective prong of 
qualified immunity analysis to create an objective-analysis qualified immunity test: “clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”34 This put the focus directly on the law and its clarity rather than an officer’s 
motives, streamlining the process. In order to analyze the case under this test, the Court 
wrote, “the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but 
whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.”35 From this case, 
qualified immunity jurisprudence drew a new dual-pronged test: 1) an actual rights 
violation under the facts alleged, and 2) that the right was clearly established at the time of 
the violation. This test, though changed in its application, continues to form the basic 
qualified immunity test to the present day. 
 
Later in the 1960s, two cases served to broaden the application of qualified immunity in § 
1983 lawsuits. In the case Malley v. Briggs, the Court wrote, “As the qualified immunity 
defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law” (emphasis added).36 Without changing the Harlow 
test, this view nonetheless construed qualified immunity as a broad shield for officers.37 
The next year, in Anderson v. Creighton, the Court established that, in order to overcome 
qualified immunity, the constitutional right in question must be clearly established “in a 
more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right.”38 This is because denying qualified immunity on the grounds that the right is 
established very broadly (such as a general reference to the Fourth Amendment) would 
essentially destroy qualified immunity altogether— officers would have no legal notice on 
which to base decisions about a particular action.39 The Court noted that, of course, this 
standard would not require that “the very action in question” has already been ruled 
unconstitutional, but that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent.”40 Though this standard emphasizes fair notice for officers (“apparent” 
unlawfulness) and not matching fact patterns (“the very action”), this standard has come to 
                                               
32 Butz v. Economou at 507-508; Scheuer v. Rhodes at 245-248. 
33 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 US 226, 232 (1991). 
34 Harlow v. Fitzgerald at 818. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
37 It is arguable that this quotation in Malley was intended to be descriptive of qualified immunity 
jurisprudence rather than an active expansion. (See Kinports, Kit. "The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of 
Qualified Immunity." Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 100, no. 62 (2016) at 66.) Nevertheless, this statement was 
later used by the Court to support expansion of qualified immunity. 
38 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 US 635, 640 (1987). 
39 Ibid., 639. 
40 Ibid., 640. 
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require plaintiffs to review case law and prove that courts have already recognized the 
right allegedly violated in a specific enough way to uphold the § 1983 lawsuit. As the Court 
rephrased this standard later, particularity requires that “various courts have agreed that 
certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way 
from the facts presented in the case at hand”41 [emphasis mine]. 
Saucier Era 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court hinted that the two prongs drawn from Harlow (actual 
violation and clearly established) ought to be addressed in order. In the case Siegert v. 
Gilley, the Court referred to the first Harlow prong as the “first inquiry” and stated that, “A 
necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by 
a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination of 
whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”42 However, the 
Court was not unanimous on this point. Kennedy wrote in his concurrence, “If it is plain 
that a plaintiff's required [] allegations are insufficient but there is some doubt as to the 
constitutional right asserted, it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues to tell the trial 
and appellate courts that they should resolve the constitutional question first.”43  
 
In the 2001 case Saucier v. Katz, the Court made the ordering of the Harlow prongs 
mandatory, establishing what is commonly referred to as “Saucier Sequencing.”44 The Court 
stated that qualified immunity analysis must start with the question: “Taken in the light 
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's 
conduct violated a constitutional right?”45 Not only is this the logical “threshold question” 
for allowing the case to proceed, it also “permits courts in appropriate cases to elaborate 
the constitutional right with greater degrees of specificity.”46 In other words, heeding 
Saucier Sequencing allows courts to contribute to the development of constitutional law in 
a way that they could not if they routinely skipped straight to the second prong of clear 
establishment. However, this ruling led to intense debate on several issues, including both 
principles and practical concerns. 
 
Saucier arguably trespasses on the jurisprudential norms concerning dicta and 
constitutional avoidance. Some argue that reaching the merits question at all in light of a 
finding of immunity promotes an authoritative view of dicta (verbiage in a court’s opinion 
that does not affect the outcome of that particular case). While dicta is not inherently 
harmful, treating it as binding precedent may be considered essentially legislative rather 
than judicial in nature.47 However, under Saucier Sequencing, courts are required to make 
judgments about constitutional law issues that have no effect on the outcome of the case 
                                               
41 Saucier v. Katz at 202. 
42 Siegert v. Gilley at 231-232. 
43 Ibid., 235. 
44 Saucier v. Katz. 
45 Ibid., 201. 
46 Ibid., 201, 207. 
47 Pierre N. Leval, “Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta,” New York University 81, no. 4 (2006): 
1249-1282. 
 
 
 
Page 64                                                    Minich •  The Right Balance: Qualified Immunity and Section 1983 
 
 
because the immunity prevents any liability. And since the purpose of creating this dicta is 
to clearly establish the law, it is assumed that future courts will treat this dicta as 
authoritative. Thus, this ruling would seem to violate an important and established judicial 
norm. On a similar vein, Saucier prompted objections over the principle of constitutional 
avoidance.48 It is generally established that courts should not rule on constitutional 
questions if there is another basis on which the decision could be based.49 Breyer’s 
concurrence (joined by Scalia and Ginsburg) in Brosseau v. Haugen expressed the concern 
that Saucier Sequencing, “rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult 
constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the decision (e. g., 
qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case before the court.”50 Similarly, 
the dissent in Morse v. Frederick argued that the Court should have decided the case on 
“clearly established” grounds, which were rather straightforward, rather than issuing an 
“unwise and unnecessary” constitutional holding in keeping with Saucier Sequencing.51 
This understanding would mean that in any case in which immunity is awarded, the court 
should avoid addressing constitutional issues. However, if this argument is correct, it 
leaves the question as to how any court could clearly establish the law in light of qualified 
immunity. This view would leave constitutional rights unarticulated and thereby 
unprotected by the courts. Thus, others argued that statements on the merits in cases with 
granted immunity are a proper use of dicta to establish the law and do not resemble the 
type of judicial overreach that standards concerning dicta and advisory opinion are 
designed to curtail.52 
 
More practical concerns questioned how Saucier would affect the quality of precedents. If 
courts are required to address a constitutional question, they will inevitably address 
constitutional questions that are fact-bound, already pending in a higher court, or 
intermingled with state law issues.53 This concern goes hand-in-hand with the problem of 
potentially poorly-considered precedents created in situations when the merits decision 
has no real effect on the outcome of the case and is therefore not thoroughly examined by 
the judge.54 And on a deeper level, these issues would likely be exacerbated by insulation 
from appellate review. That is, if a court found that an officer had violated the constitution 
and yet awarded immunity, the plaintiff would have no interest in appealing the merits 
ruling, and the officer—as the prevailing party—would be unable to appeal. This also 
                                               
48 Ibid. 
49 “Constitutional Avoidance,” Wex Legal Dictionary, Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_avoidance. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Assn., 485 US 439,445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint 
requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”) 
(Citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 157-158 
(1984); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 854 (1985); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 99 (1981); and 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).) 
50 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2004), (Breyer, concurring). 
51 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007) (Breyer, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
52 Jack M. Beermann, "Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance," The Supreme Court Review 2009, no. 
1 (2009): 139-79. 
53 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818-821 (2009) 
54 Ibid. 
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means that, if the officer repeated the act, he would face liability for an act that was 
declared unconstitutional in an unappealable decision.55 Furthermore, the mere fact of 
requiring briefing on complex constitutional issues threatens to undo the point of qualified 
immunity, which is to provide a quick dismissal for unsubstantial claims.56 
 
Because of these complaints, Saucier was unpopular in the lower courts, which sometimes 
ignored it.57 Even at the Supreme Court, Justices turned against Saucier. Justice Breyer 
wrote in Morse v. Frederick, “I would end the failed Saucier experiment now,” and Justice 
Alito’s opinion for the Court in Pearson detailed many of the complaints about Saucier.58 
With just shy of eight years’ reign and a growing mountain of objections, mandatory 
Saucier Sequencing was struck down by Pearson v. Callahan.59 
Pearson Era 
Analyzing the considerations involved in stare decisis and court-made rules, as well as the 
complaints against Saucier, the Pearson Court concluded that “experience supports our 
present determination that a mandatory, two-step rule for resolving all qualified immunity 
claims should not be retained” and announced that Saucier Sequencing “should no longer 
be regarded as mandatory.”60 However, Pearson did not end the question of Saucier 
Sequencing by making it optional. The Court’s opinion stated that Saucier Sequencing is 
“often appropriate” and “often beneficial.”61 The Court called on lower courts to use, “their 
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis 
should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”62 
Consequently, this ruling failed to address many concerns about Saucier jurisprudence, 
leaving lower courts with a gargantuan field of discretion and parties with substantial legal 
uncertainty. This is far from the ideal, which would be a straightforward legal system in 
which no more than one plaintiff goes without remediation for a given rights violation for 
the sake of establishing the law and providing officers “fair notice.”63 Instead, “[s]ubstantial 
uncertainty and unpredictability have become the norm in qualified immunity cases 
because of the inherent manipulability of the test.”64 This uncertainty can waste time with 
unwanted briefs on the merits, or it can lead to litigant strategizing, such as neglecting to 
address a merits in order to convince a court to avoid the question altogether (although 
                                               
55 Aaron Belzer, “The Audacity of Ignoring Hope: How the Existing Qualified Immunity Analysis Leads to 
Unremedied Rights,” Denver University Law Review 90, no. 3 (2013): 647-689. 
56 Pearson v. Callahan at 818-821. 
57 Ryan E. Meltzer, “Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: ‘Clearly 
Establishing’ the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police,” Texas Law Review 92, no. 5 (2014): 1277-1315. 
58 Morse v. Frederick at 2642 (Breyer, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Pearson v. 
Callahan at 818-821. 
59 Pearson v. Callahan. 
60 Ibid., 817-18. 
61 Ibid., 818. 
62 Ibid., 818. 
63 Belzer; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 US 730 (2002). 
64 “Federal Courts. Qualified Immunity. Sixth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity to Police Officer for Arrest for 
Speech at Public Meeting. Leonard v. Robinson, No. 05-1728, 2007 WL 283832 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2007).” 
Harvard Law Review 120, no. 8 (2007): 2238-245.  
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Justice Scalia strongly opposes this method of “snookering”65).66 Judges also may be 
tempted by the potential for strategic rulings that comes with so much discretion.67 
Because the Pearson decision increases judges’ ability to influence the possibility of appeal 
and the likelihood of appeals courts reaching the merits, they are motivated to act in their 
best policy interests rather than as neutral arbiters.  
 
Pearson also left open the question of constitutional development. Although the Court 
noted in both Saucier and Pearson that much of the legal system’s articulation of rights 
relies on constitutional rulings in § 1983 claims, the absence of clear guidance leaves little 
incentive for courts to address difficult constitutional questions, as well as broad discretion 
to skip over the merits without necessarily explaining why. And the lower courts do just 
that, leading the justice system definitively away from constitutional rights development.68 
Practically speaking, this means that every time a court declines to reach the merits of a § 
1983 constitutional claim because it grants immunity, the law remains not “clearly 
established.” Thus, the next case, even if virtually identical, will have the same result: 
immunity and no constitutional ruling. If the law is never clearly established because the 
merits are always passed over, rights become constricted as they remain undetermined by 
the courts.69 This is a devastating blow to constitutional rights as a whole. Indeed, “[a]t a 
time in which it is vital for constitutional law to keep pace with changes in technology, 
social norms, and political practices, this trend toward granting immunity while failing to 
articulate constitutional rights will surely have far-reaching negative repercussions.”70  
The Current Era 
The latest landmark cases for qualified immunity include Camreta v. Greene, which weighed 
in on appellate insulation, rights articulation, and standards for reaching the merits. This 
case opened up the possibility for prevailing party review—accepting appeals from officers 
who won immunity but lost merits rulings. The Court wrote, “We conclude that this Court 
generally may review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government 
official granted immunity.”71 They limited this doctrine, though, by requiring that all parties 
involved still have prospective interest, or a “‘personal stake’ in the suit.”72 Not only does 
this weed out cases without a prospective effect on the parties involved, it also ensures that 
                                               
65 City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765 (2015). 
66 Beermann, 143 ff.  
67 Michael T.  Kirkpatrick and Joshua Matz, “Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity and the 
Elaboration of Constitutional Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond),” Fordham Law Review 80, no. 2 
(2011): 643-679.  
68Stephen R.  Reinhardt, "The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever 
Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly 
Unfortunate Consequences," Mich. L. Rev. 113 (2014): 1219-1254, at 1244 - 1249. (Citing Karen Blum et al., 
Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 Touro L. Rev. 633, 657 (2013) at 
647.) 
69 Belzer at 654. 
70 Reinhardt at 1250. 
71 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2011). 
72 Camreta v. Greene at 2028 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 
1148-1149, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009)). 
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the case retains its adversarial nature, “which sharpens the presentation of issues.”73 Based 
on this doctrine, the court found that the officer involved in the case had standing to appeal 
because he “regularly engages in that conduct as part of his job” that was ruled 
unconstitutional by the lower court and therefore “suffers injury caused by the adverse 
constitutional ruling.”74 Thus, “So long as it continues in effect, he must either change the 
way he performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.”75 Although the majority 
developed this doctrine, they declined to use it in this case because the plaintiff, a child at 
the time of the alleged offense, was about to turn eighteen and had moved away to another 
state.76 Therefore, the Court declared the case moot and voided the constitutional rulings 
from below. This demonstrates a main limitation on prevailing party review—all parties 
involved must remain in a position of potential harm. This construction of prevailing party 
review keeps appeals from slipping out of the context of legal adversity and into the realm 
of legal hypotheticals. However, this restriction could limit its application to areas such as 
excessive force cases (where officers would have a difficult time explaining why they 
expected to be in a similar situation again) or cases involving children (who may reach the 
age of eighteen before the case reaches the Supreme Court).77 Nevertheless, this ruling 
addresses the concern of appellate insulation, even if imperfectly. 
 
On the issue of rights articulation, the majority considered the fact that leaving 
constitutional questions without answers because of qualified immunity can result in 
unarticulated rights. Taking immunity as a reason to avoid the merits “for another day” 
faces the problem that such a “day may never come—that our regular policy of avoidance 
sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it threatens to leave 
standards of official conduct permanently in limbo.”78 Along these lines, the Court made 
clear that it does not consider constitutional rulings in cases where immunity is awarded to 
be unimportant for future cases. The majority wrote that, “The constitutional 
determinations that prevailing parties ask us to consider in these cases are not mere dicta 
or ‘statements in opinions.’”79 In other words, even though the constitutional rulings do not 
affect the outcome of the case, they should nonetheless be considered authoritative for the 
purpose of clearly establishing the law. In the eyes of those who emphasize the need to 
develop constitutional law through merits decisions, this case “brought badly needed 
clarity to the dicta/precedent boundary, tipping merits decisions issued alongside a finding 
of qualified immunity decisively toward the realm of ‘precedent.’”80 However, not all the 
justices agreed on this point. Justice Kennedy wrote in his dissent (joined by Justice 
                                               
73 Ibid., 2028 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). 
74 Ibid., 2029. 
75 Ibid., 2029. 
76 Ibid., 2033-2034. 
77 Kirkpatrick at 662 (application to excessive force). 
78 Camreta v. Greene at 2031 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841, n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 
L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). 
79 Camreta v. Greene at 2030 (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 
(1987) (per curiam)). 
80 Kirkpatrick at 669. 
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Thomas), “Dictum, though not precedent, may have its utility; but it ought not to be treated 
as a judgment standing on its own.”81  
 
The Court also took a step toward further defining the standards for reaching the merits. 
Referencing Pearson, they wrote that they had recently established, “a range of 
circumstances in which courts should address only the immunity question” [emphasis 
added]. Michael Kirkpatrick and Joshua Matz argue that reading this statement in light of 
Pearson signals a standard that lower courts are not permitted to reach the merits in 1) 
fact-bound cases, 2) issues pending in a higher court, 3) questions muddled with state law, 
and 4) unclear claims.82 If this interpretation is correct, this case is definitely an 
improvement in providing clear standards for lower courts. However, not every justice 
agreed with the majority opinion on this matter. Justice Kennedy’s dissent declares that the 
majority’s decision “results from what is emerging as a rather troubling consequence from 
the reasoning of our recent qualified immunity cases…the correct solution is not to 
override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the 
necessity of avoiding advisory opinions…So, while acknowledging the problem the Court 
confronts, my concern with the rule adopted for this case calls for this respectful dissent.”83 
Similarly, although Justice Scalia concurred with the Court’s decision, he suggested turning 
Saucier on its head by stopping “the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional 
questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity.”84 These 
separate opinions illustrate qualified immunity’s ever-present tension between rights 
articulation and restraint based on common judicial rules. And given the varied views 
expressed by the justices, the Court clearly has not settled on a comfortable compromise. 
Scalia’s suggestion and Kennedy’s dissent are concerning to those who see merits rulings as 
valuable enough to override traditional constitutional avoidance, fearing the “worrisome 
possibility that several Justices are losing faith in the basic framework of qualified 
immunity doctrine.”85  
 
Occurring in tandem with Camreta, the case Ashcroft v. al-Kidd spoke to the Court’s 
standard for particularity. Here, the Court held that qualified immunity requires that 
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate” in order to hold officers liable.86 Scalia wrote for the Court, “A Government official's 
conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he 
contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ Anderson v. Creighton.”87 By breaking 
up the sentence in this quotation from Anderson and replacing what used to be the word “a” 
                                               
81 Camreta v. Greene at 2037 (Kennedy, dissenting). 
82 Kirkpatrick at 677. 
83 Camreta v. Greene at 2037 (Kennedy, dissenting). 
84 Camreta v. Greene at 2036 (Scalia, concurring) (citing Saucier v. Katz). 
85 Kirkpatrick at 669. 
86 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, at 2083 (2011). 
87 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd at 2083. 
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with the word “every,” the Court expanded the standard for qualified immunity subtly but 
substantially.88 Following cases reinforced this revision by quoting the alteration.89  
 
Through recent years, this expanded view of qualified immunity protection has guided 
Supreme Court cases. In City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015), police shot and 
killed a dangerous mentally-ill woman. In concluding that the officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity, the Court skirted both the legal questions pertaining to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and the question of whether or not the officers’ actions violated the 
Fourth Amendment, stating, “...so long as ‘a reasonable officer could have believed that his 
conduct was justified,’ a plaintiff cannot ‘avoi[d] summary judgment by simply producing 
an expert's report that an officer's conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was 
imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless.’”90 In Mullenix v. Luna (2015), the Court ruled 
in favor of qualified immunity for an officer who shot and killed a man instead of following 
orders to use a spike strip to stop his vehicle. Addressing only the question of qualified 
immunity and not the merits of the constitutional claim, the Court chastised lower courts 
for relying on “established law at a high level of generality”91 and instead upheld an 
analysis “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”92 
This Court opinion also did not mention the § 1983 interest of upholding constitutional 
rights or remediating their violation.93 In the case White v. Pauley (2017), the Court granted 
qualified immunity because plaintiffs had “failed to identify a case where an officer acting 
under similar circumstances as Officer White was held to have violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”94 Yet, courts have used materials other than case law to determine that right 
was clearly established, leaving the questions of why a court should seek analogous 
precedent at all if there is a convincing reason that the officer was awarded fair notice that 
his actions would be illegal.95 Nevertheless, decisions such as these as well as the 
“increasingly generous terms” applied to qualified immunity show a trend toward a broad 
view of qualified immunity protections.96  
 
                                               
88 Kit Kinports, "The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity," Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 100, 
no. 62 (2016) at 65 ff. 
89 See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); and 
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015). 
90 City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan at 1777 (2015) (quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 
(C.A.9 2002)). 
91 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). 
92 Mullenix v. Luna at 308 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, (2004), which in turn was quoting 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
93 Kinports at 68. 
94 White v. Pauley, 580 U.S. __ (2017). (Slip opinion at page 6). 
95 Meltzer at 1295ff. 
96 Kinports at 64. (“In a number of recent rulings, the Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly broadening 
the defense, describing it in increasingly generous terms and inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that 
then take on a life of their own. This pattern began in 2011 with Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and continued with last 
Term’s decisions in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan and Heien v. North Carolina.”). 
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Current Questions in Qualified Immunity 
As these recent cases make clear, the Court is still wrestling with the processes and 
consequences behind qualified immunity jurisprudence. The main concerns in the era of 
Camreta and Ashcroft are 1) remaining appellate insulation, 2) rights articulation and 
constitutional avoidance, 3) standards for reaching the merits and 4) particularity. The 
trends in these areas are mixed—by opening a door to appellate review for prevailing 
parties, Camreta dealt with a large portion of the appellate insulation problem. It also 
emphasized the importance of rights articulation and its position on the precedent/dicta 
boundary, clearing the way for courts to establish rights even when granting immunity. 
Furthermore, it arguably took a step toward increased guidance for lower courts on when 
to reach the merits and when to address only immunity. However, the Court’s positions in 
Camreta are neither unanimous nor irrevocable. It is possible that the Court will shift 
positions again, trading the current concerns about flouting constitutional avoidance 
norms for the opposite concern of stagnating constitutional rights articulation. 
 
While Camreta works in favor of plaintiffs by increasing rights articulation, Ashcroft works 
against plaintiffs by making lawsuits much more difficult to win. As Sheehan, Mullenix, and 
White demonstrate, the current construction of particularity makes establishing liability 
extraordinarily difficult. In other words, under Ashcroft, qualified immunity protection has 
expanded as § 1983 remedy for right violations has contracted. Although this expansion 
presents itself as most disconcerting in cases that involve alarming fact patterns, the real 
question is how qualified immunity ought to apply broadly—whether an increased 
application of qualified immunity continues to uphold the balance between protection of 
officers and the § 1983 remedy. This question is distinctly important because qualified 
immunity is a “judge-made rule”97 and does not carry the legal weight of a Congressionally-
passed federal law. Yet, it works against § 1983 as a limiting factor, justified mainly by the 
fact that § 1983 did not explicitly repeal common-law immunities that might limit it.98 As 
qualified immunity expands, it encroaches more and more on the effective use of § 1983, 
making this judicially-created norm a powerful force to stymie § 1983 actions.99 Even 
absent practical concerns or disturbing facts, this encroachment on the separation of 
powers should be closely watched. Contrary to the particularity standards once supported 
in Hope v. Peltzer that focused on fair notice for officers and rejected the idea that cases had 
to be factually similar in order to apply, it is clear from the cases following Ashcroft that 
particularity standards have shifted toward a focus on factual similarity. 100 This tips the 
scales away from remedy for violations and puts plaintiffs in a bind if they are unable to 
match their factual circumstances with precedents, even when a right has clearly been 
violated.101 
                                               
97 Pearson v. Callahan at 816. 
98 Pierson v. Ray at 554-555. 
99 See Kinports at 78. 
100 Hope v. Pelzer at 741 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 73 F. 3d 1380, 1393 (CA6 1996)) (“officials can still 
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Indeed, in Lanier, 
we expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be ‘fundamentally similar.’”). 
101 Aaron Belzer illustrates this using the case Kerns v. Bader. See Belzer, supra, note 55; Hope v. Pelzer. 
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The Legal Argument in Maney v. Garrison 
Naturally, these current concerns come into play in lower courts—the only courts that 
most litigants will ever see. Returning to the case discussed at the beginning illustrates how 
courts apply qualified immunity precedent—for better or for worse. The court here 
identified the legal question as: “[W]hether a police canine handler, whose dog suddenly 
and mistakenly bites a concealed bystander while tracking the scent of a robbery suspect, 
clearly violates the Fourth Amendment if he momentarily extends the seizure to assess the 
potential threat to officer safety.”102 Stating also that the case and legal questions were too 
fact-bound to be of good use for precedent, they skipped the first Harlow prong (actual 
violation) and analyzed only the second (clearly established).103 In its analysis, it relied 
mainly on Pearson, Harlow, and al-Kidd. The court did mention the need to balance officer 
accountability and protection from frivolous suits.104 However, the court leaned much 
more heavily on al-Kidd, citing the “beyond debate” idea no less than five times.105 The 
opinion also cites the “every reasonable officer” idea multiple times as though it is the 
implicitly obvious legal standard, but it never cites it as coming from al-Kidd.106 The court 
also pulled in language from Malley through al-Kidd, stating, “Like the district court, I 
cannot say Appellee acted perfectly under the circumstances. But by the same token I 
cannot say his actions rose to the level of plain incompetence or knowing violations of the 
law.”107 Further, adopting the particularity standard of al-Kidd and Mullinex, the court sets 
forth the familiar high bar for particularity.108 
 
Tying this framework in with the facts of the case and the pertinent cases, the court found 
that none of the cases cited by the Appellant (Maney) were close enough to the facts at 
hand to render the legal question “clearly established.” The factually closest case, Kopf v. 
Wing, was not considered close enough to Maney’s case because it, “only found that a jury 
may conclude that forcing a person to show his hands prior to calling off the police K-9 is 
                                               
102 Maney v. Garrison at 3. 
103 Ibid., 9. 
104 Ibid., 9. 
105 Ibid., 10 (“beyond debate”), 13 (“beyond debate”), 15 (“beyond constitutional debate”), 19 (“beyond 
debate”), 21 (“beyond question”). 
106 Ibid., 15 (referencing appellant’s argument), 17 (“The question, then, is whether every 
reasonable officer would have known the second and third bites were clearly unreasonable”), 21 (“Under 
those circumstances, we cannot say that every reasonable officer would have known his conduct was, beyond 
question, a violation of the Fourth Amendment”), 23 (“common sense tells me that things may not be as clear 
to every cop on the beat as the dissent would suggest”), and footnote 7 (“The timing of the events in question 
is, however, relevant to the question we do answer: whether every reasonable officer in Appellee’s shoes 
would have known his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment”). 
107 Ibid., 25. 
108 Ibid., 9-10. (“We therefore proceed to the second question, keeping in mind that “a defendant cannot be 
said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any 
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). In other words, while a case directly on point is not required, “existing 
precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. “The 
dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullinex v. 
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).” 
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excessive force, but did not state definitively that such conduct did in fact amount to a 
constitutional violation” (internal citation and quotation marks removed).109 Thus, based 
on the broad view of qualified immunity protection embodied in more recent cases, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court’s award of qualified immunity for Garrison. This is 
despite the fact that, in the judge’s words, “I would not hold, must less suggest, that 
Appellee’s deployment of [his police dog] complied with the Fourth Amendment.”110  
 
For those concerned with constitutional rights articulation, this raises important questions. 
If the Fourth Circuit was able to articulate a discrete legal question about Garrison’s 
actions, why did they not take the chance to answer it? Even in this case, they posit that no 
analogous precedent exists for the undeserved harm done to Maney. This alone, then, 
should be reason enough to offer legal guidance for similar future situations. Otherwise, 
this area of law remains just as obscure as the court argues it was when the alleged 
violation took place. Furthermore, what should courts focus on when determining whether 
or not the right in question has been particularly established? As expressly stated in Hope 
(and arguably implied in Anderson), the crux would be fair notice for officers.111 However, 
for the court in Maney, the main focus is the al-Kidd approach: whether or not they can find 
case law that applies so particularly that it cannot be distinguished from the case at hand in 
any meaningful way.  
Improving the System: Accountability, Rights 
Articulation, and Standards 
With both its advantages and pitfalls, qualified immunity jurisprudence could be improved 
in the areas of accountability, rights articulation, and standards for both reaching the 
merits and discerning the correct application of particularity. The changes sought in these 
areas should adhere to the role of the judiciary, meaning that they do not rest on individual 
desired outcomes but on consistency and fairness. While judges may not relish the idea of 
imposing liability on officers who made poor split-second decisions, § 1983 jurisprudence 
ought to be based on a fair balance of interest that remediates and establishes law in an 
even-handed and predictable way. Judges also need not allow their jurisprudence to be 
clouded by considering too heavily the costs of liability, since “Police officers are virtually 
always indemnified.”112 This means that mercy on a particular officer in a § 1983 case is 
really only a break for the municipality who would have been required to pay the judgment 
against an officer. Thus, increasing the qualified immunity protection for officers ultimately 
could serve to disincentivize robust training and appropriate disciplinary steps by local 
governments, all while denying plaintiffs their just remediation. 
 
                                               
109 Ibid., 13. 
110 Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991); Maney v. Garrison at 22 (citing the district court’s decision, J.A. 
383). 
111 Hope v. Pelzer at 741. 
112Joanna C.  Schwartz, “Police Indemnification,” New York University Law Review 89 (2014): 885-1005, at 
890. 
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Addressing Appellate Insulation 
Michael Kirkpatrick and Joshua Matz suggest that the current system needs very little 
revision, as it represents an imperfect but necessary balance that they call “structured 
discretion.”113 Viewing Camreta as a well-crafted solution to many of the issues under 
Saucier and Pearson, they write that the next improvement to make is expanding prevailing 
party review to en banc appeals, which would help to balance out extreme panel decision 
and cultivate a sense of accountability in the appeals court panels.114 
Rights Articulation and Reaching the Merits 
Jack Beerman wrote that reaching the merits should be the default for courts unless they 
are dealing with a certain type of case (useless or fact-bound precedent, a conflict with 
state law, or an imminent higher court decision).115 Under those cases, the court would not 
be permitted to reach the merits. Aaron Belzer proposes a similar solution, recommending 
instead that the courts use practical criteria for reaching the merits, looking at 1) the 
remedy for the plaintiff, 2) the capability of repetition, and 3) the goal of adequate 
development for the sake of establishing legal precedent.116 These methods would 
eliminate the unbridled discretion that plagues current qualified immunity disputes. It 
would also require courts to articulate their reasons for not reaching the merits. In the 
process, it would encourage and promote constitutional law development. These solutions 
may or may not fix the issue of wasted litigant resources, as the counsel could not be 
entirely sure whether the court would reach the merits or avoid them, but in the very least 
they would give criteria to guide briefing and make the process more predictable. 
Moreover, since these ideas closely approximate the kind of standards that Camreta 
seemed to favor, this improvement may come in time, being established in following 
qualified immunity cases. 
Particularity 
The issue of particularity standards blocking § 1983 is mitigated in part by increased rights 
articulation—more cases clearly establishing rights means more factual scenarios in which 
rights are expressly protected. However, this is by no means a satisfactory solution, since it 
leaves much room for plaintiffs to face the wall of qualified immunity even when they 
ought to be afforded the remedy that § 1983 intends to award. Thus, the Court needs to re-
center its particularity rulings so as to better balance competing concerns. Unless the goal 
is to limit § 1983 to only repeated, virtually identical violations, a further emphasis on fair 
notice rather than analogous precedent is in order. The basis for this focus is already 
established in Hope, and even back in the softer language of Anderson. Thus, a move to a 
less strict view of particularity would not require a strong divergence from precedent but 
only a shift in the way such standards are expressed. 
                                               
113 Kirkpatrick at 656. 
114 Ibid., 664-665. 
115 Beermann at 160 ff. 
116 Belzer at 687. 
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Litigant-Led Change 
In the absence of Court-mandated changes, James Pfander has recommended the use of 
lawsuits for nominal damages in order to clarify the law without presenting a threat to 
individual officers.117 This has an advantage over declaratory judgment suits in that they 
need not be prospective (requiring the plaintiff to show that the action in question will 
likely be repeated). And since nominal damages claims would not serve to impose a 
substantial personal liability on officers, Pfander argues, they should not give rise to 
qualified immunity claims. Clearly, this method would have to rely on special interest 
groups and nonprofits to fund monetarily unprofitable litigation. However, this method 
could be extraordinarily effective in helping to establish rights in the absence of Court 
rulings that prioritize rights articulation. This is especially important if indeed, “The shift 
from Pearson to Camreta thus signals disfavor toward merits rulings and a broad new 
range of circumstances under which the merits cannot be reached.”118 However, this 
solution would require courts to accept this method because it is not an established 
method for avoiding qualified immunity. 
 
Naturally, these solutions do not establish a perfect system. However, that can be expected 
in the legal context, which carries the difficult requirement of handling wildly differing 
factual scenarios and problems. 
Radical Solutions: More Drawbacks Than Benefits 
“Efforts to reform doctrine always raise the possibility that a court is simply trading one 
problem for another.”119 Because of this, and because qualified immunity jurisprudence is 
not hopelessly broken, violent revisions of the system are neither necessary nor desirable. 
One such solution is to abolish qualified immunity and create a system in which juries 
determine which alleged facts are true and the judge determines the reasonableness of the 
officers’ actions based on the jury’s findings.120 This approach would place the emphasis on 
a reasonableness standard rather than the Harlow standards, resolving the ambiguity of 
“clearly established” jurisprudence. It would also ensure that juries and judges played their 
proper roles—judges determining law and juries determining facts. However, it also 
destroys the purpose of qualified immunity, which is to ensure that police officers are not 
made less effective by either the threat or the actuality of being embroiled in litigation. This 
would also be an extremely abrupt reversal of well-established jurisprudence, meaning 
that the Court would likely not consider such a solution. 
 
Other solutions involve outsourcing the legal questions. Instead of courts, Civilian 
Complaint Review Boards could have authority to investigate complaints, clearly establish 
                                               
117 James E. Pfander, “Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal 
Damages,” Columbia Law Review 111, no. 7 (2011): 1601-1639. 
118 Kirkpatrick at 670. 
119 Ibid., 667-70. 
120 Philip Sheng, “An ‘Objectively Reasonable’ Criticism of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive 
Force Cases Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” BYU Journal of Public Law 26, no. 1 (2011): 99-110. 
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the law, promulgate their rulings as law, and recommend punishments to police boards for 
verified officer misconduct.121 This suggestion has the advantage of a firm grounding in 
already existent boards, so it has some empirical evidence in its favor. It could also be less 
costly and more specialized than typical jury trials. However, handing the interpretation of 
law to such boards seems to be an unwarranted and unwise delegation of power. It would 
also be difficult to curb corruption or bias, and there is no clear way to resolve disparities 
between review board rulings. This idea also does not fix the issue of constitutional 
avoidance but rather farms out difficult and unclear legal issues to less qualified 
individuals. Is it really desirable for these agencies to be “constantly engaged in 
constitutional-norm generation”?122 It also leaves the question as to how officers can be 
expected to keep abreast the scads of law coming from the boards—New York City alone 
settled 9,570 claims in 2012.123 This really defeats the idea of officers having fair notice of 
the law. It is also possible that these review board investigations would have the same 
negative effect as a lawsuit on police effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
The system of § 1983 litigation has seen many changes in the nearly 150 years since its 
enactment. Throughout this time, it has faced varying challenges, sometimes trading one 
set of jurisprudential concerns for another. At the current point, this area of law could be 
improved by increased accountability and standards for the lower courts, as well as a 
proper priority given to rights articulation and remediation. If used properly, § 1983 
litigation serves not only to keep law enforcement in check, but also to “translate 
constitutional norms into specific rules, thereby achieving the related goals of redressing 
individual violations and effectuating deeper values.”124 At the same time, courts need not 
abandon the principles of notice and fairness that give legitimacy to the idea of qualified 
immunity. Such a balance is difficult in the face of the various cases that complicate the 
application of these ideas, but a just and consistent jurisprudence is possible through 
respecting the boundaries appropriate for each aspect. 
  
                                               
121 Meltzer 1280 ff. 
122 Ibid., 1294. 
123 Ibid., 1293. 
124 Kirkpatrick at 672.  
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